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HONORING TREATY RIGHTS AND CONSERVING
ENDANGERED SPECIES AFTER UNITED STATES v.
DION
Sally J. Johnson'
Like the miner's canary, the Indian marks the shifts from fresh air to poison
gas in our political atmosphere, and our treatment of Indians, even more than
our treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic
faith. 2
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v Dion' the Supreme Court expressly sidestepped
the issue of whether the Endangered Species Act' abrogates Indian treaty
rights to hunt and fish on reservation lands.5 Six years later, the question
raised in Dion remains unanswered by the Supreme Court. As framed, the
issue forces a conflict between honoring treaty rights and -conserving
endangered and threatened species. The purpose of this note is to predict
the Supreme Court's eventual resolution of the dispute as framed, and
propose an alternative solution which honors treaty rights and conserves
endangered species.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Indian Treaty Rights to Hunt and Fish
Although all Indian treaties were executed over 100 years ago6, unless
otherwise modified, these treaties remain in effect.7 Indian treaties often fix
geographic boundaries, define tribal rights on and off reservation lands,
and detail issues of tribal sovereignty 8
A treaty is "not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights
I. B.A. 1978, University of Montana; M.A. 1981, Northwestern University; J.D. Candidate,
University of Montana School of Law. The American Bar Association's section on Natural Resources,
Energy, and Environmental Law awarded this paper second place in its 1992 writing contest. The
author is indebted to Prof. Margery H. Brown, John B. Carter, and Grant D. Parker for guidance and
suggestions. They are, of course, not responsible for this interpretation.
2. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW at v, (1982 ed.).
3. 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
4. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
5. Dion, 476 U.S. at 745.
6. In 1871, Congress enacted legislation halting treaty making with Indian tribes. Act of Mar. 3,
1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544 (codified as carried forward at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988)). The statute
called for a continuation of existing treaties. F Cohen, supra note 2, at 62.
7. Tsosie v. United States, 825 F.2d 393 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
8. F COHEN, supra note 2, at 62-70.
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from them - a reservation of those not granted."' As a general rule, tribes
hold treaty rights to hunt and fish on the lands reserved to them"0 and
individual tribal members may assert those tribal treaty rights.1 Even
where a treaty is silent on hunting and fishing rights, tribes reserve the right
to maintain their way of life which includes hunting and fishing.' 2 Tribal
hunting and fishing rights are property rights protected by treaty 13
Courts have traditionally construed treaties from the perspective of
the Indians at the time they entered the treaties'4 and resolved ambiguities
in treaty language in favor of the tribes.' 5 Several implicit policy reasons
support these canons of construction. Courts acknowledge the communi-
cation difficulties' 6 and unequal bargaining power' 7 between Indians and
non-Indians during most treaty negotiations and use these principles of
treaty interpretation to redress the inequities.' Treaty interpretation also
rests on the "unique trust relationship" between the United States and the
tribes. 9
In the context of this trust relationship between the federal govern-
ment and Indian tribes, Congress maintains the power to unilaterally
abrogate Indian treaties.2" To pass constitutional muster, however, Con-
gress must compensate the tribe if treaty abrogation takes a recognized
property right. 21 The Supreme Court recognizes Indian treaty rights to
9. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
10. Dion, 476 U.S. at 738. Cases have distinguished treaty rights on and off the reservation
(Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game of Washington, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (Puyallup I)) and those lands
held in fee from those lands on the reservation which the tribe no longer holds (Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't
of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (Puyallup III)). The right to hunt a species does not
necessarily entail a right to sell the catch. United States v. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 486, 487-88 (9th Cir.
1976). Courts have tied commercial hunting and fishing rights to traditional practice by the affected
tribe. United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261, 1265, n. 11 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) rev d inpart, 476 U.S.
734 (1986).
11. Dion, 476 U.S. at 738, n.4.
12. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 406 (1968). Additionally, "Indian
reservations created by statute, agreement, or executive order normally carry with them the same
implicit hunting rights as those created by treaty." Dion, 476 U.S. at 745 n.8.
13. Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 406.
14. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381; Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970).
15. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 63 1; Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675-76 (1979). Additionally, some treaties expressly provide that
interpretation of ambiguities should favor the Indians. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 631.
16. Winans, 198 U.S. at 380.
17. Id., Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 630-31.
18. Cf. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass n, 443 U.S. at 675-76
(assuming equal bargaining position, the Court followed these canons of construction given the United
States' "presumptively superior negotiating skills and superior knowledge of the language in which the
treaty is recorded.")
19. Winans, 198 U.S. at 380-81.
20. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903).
21. Sioux Nation v. United States, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). But cf, Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United
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hunt and fish as compensable property rights.22
"The intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly
imputed to the Congress."2 The Court requires "plain and clear congres-
sional intent to abrogate Indian treaty rights," '24 and has stated various
standards for determining if the requisite intent is present.25 The Court
prefers, but does not require, an express declaration of congressional intent
to abrogate a treaty 28 Legislative history, "surrounding circumstances,"
and "the face of the Act" can be sufficiently compelling-to-demonstrate
congressional intent to abrogate.2 7 In Dion, the Court reviewed and
clarified the standard: "What is essential is clear evidence that Congress
actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand
and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by
abrogating the treaty "28 One commentator refers to the test articulated in
Dion as "the actual consideration and choice test."29 The actual considera-
tion and choice test is the Court's most recent articulation of the standard
for treaty abrogation.
One area of congressional action that poses significant potential
conflict with tribal treaty rights to hunt and fish is the Endangered Species
Act of 1973 (ESA) 3 Following Dion, the Court would apply the actual
consideration and choice test to determine if the ESA abrogates Indian
treaty rights to hunt and fish species protected by the ESA. In doing so, the
Court would assess whether the legislative history, surrounding circum-
stances, or the face of the ESA demonstrate sufficiently compelling
evidence to demonstrate that Congress intended for the ESA to abrogate
those Indian treaty rights.
B. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 1
"[T]he Endangered Species Act of 1973 represents the most compre-
States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) in which the Court held that rights based solely on aboriginal title are not
compensable. However, in that decision the Court explicitly distinguished property rights based solely
on aboriginal title (which are not compensable) from those rights (including treaty rights) based on
some congressional action which are compensable. Id. at 277-78, 288-89.
22. Menommnee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 413.
23. Pigeon River Co. v. Cox Co., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934).
24. Dion, 476 U.S. at 738.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 739.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 740.
29. Robert Laurence, The Bald Eagle, the Florida Panther and the Nation s Word: An.Essay
on the "Quiet" Abrogation of Indian Treaties and the Proper Reading of United States v. Dion, 4 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 12 (1988).
30. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
31. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
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hensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted
by any nation."32 The ESA establishes procedures for listing endangered"
and threatened34 species and makes it illegal for "any person" to "take" a
listed species.3 5 Hearing an early case on the ESA, the Supreme Court
declared, "The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt
and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost."'
3
Pursuant to the ESA, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service had
listed 633 species as threatened or endangered in the United States as of
October, 1991 37 This list included 362 wildlife species and 271 plant
species with habitat dispersed throughout all 50 states.38
The ESA provides a few, narrow exceptions to its sweeping prohibi-
tion on the taking of endangered and threatened species. The ESA excepts
the taking of an endangered or threatened species by "(A) any Indian,
Aleut, or Eskimo who is an Alaskan Native who resides in Alaska; or (B)
any non-native permanent resident of an Alaskan native village; if such
taking is primarily for subsistence purposes.139 Legislative history indi-
cates the Senate included an Alaskan native subsistence exception in the
ESA as a hardship provision, "as a means of preserving social unity," and
because the native "take" did not pose the principal threat to the protected
species.4 0 The House bill did not provide a similar exception.41 The
conference committee wrote the final version of the subsistence provision to
include Alaskan non-natives similarly situated to the excepted natives. 2
32. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
33. Defined as "any species (except some insect species) which is in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).
34. Defined as "any species which is likely to become an endangered species within the
foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(l)(B). The ESA defines the term "take" to mean, "to harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."
16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). Courts have interpreted this broad definition of "taking" to include United
States Forest Service management practices when clearcutting caused a dramatic decline in
endangered red-cockaded woodpeckers (Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F Supp. 1260 (E.D. Texas 1988))
and habitat destruction when a state maintained population of feral goats and sheep destroyed
vegetation upon which an endangered bird, the Palila, depends (Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land and Nat.
Resources (Palila II), 649 F Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986), affid 842 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988)).
36. Tennessee Valley Authority, 437 U.S. at 184. Ironically, the ESA's strength is provoking
serious political attacks by ranching and pro-development interest groups as the ESA faces
reauthorization in 1993. Michael J. Bean, Taking Stock: The Endangered Species Act in the Eye of a
Growing Storm, 13 PuB. LAND LAW REV supra (1992) (in press).
37 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11-.12 (1991).
38. Id.
39. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e).
40. S. Rep. No. 307,93rd Cong., 1 st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1973 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
2989, 2993. The ESA also contains a hardship exemption. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(b).
41. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 740, 93rd Cong., ist Sess. 2, reprinted in 1973 U.S. Code, Cong. &
Admin. News 2989, 3006.
42. Id.
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The House agreed to this compromise language because other language in
the ESA allowed states to further restrict takings if necessary43
III. UNITED STATES V DioN44
Dion arose when the United States Fish and Wildlife Service caught
Dwight Dion, Sr. and three other Indian men in a "sting" operation.
4 5
Dion, an enrolled member of the Yankton Sioux, killed four bald eagles
and a golden eagle on the Yankton Sioux Reservation and sold them to
undercover agents.4"
Among other things, the Government prosecuted Dion under the
Eagle Protection Act (EPA)47, which protects both bald and golden eagles,
and the Endangered Species Act (ESA), which protects bald eagles. As
one defense, Dion asserted that the Yankton Sioux reserved treaty rights to
hunt and fish on their'lands.48 The trial court convicted Dion on several
counts including killing bald eagles in violation of the ESA and selling
eagle carcasses and parts in violation of the EPA.49 The Eighth Circuit,
sitting en banc, found that Congress did not abrogate treaty rights to hunt
eagles by enacting the EPA or the ESA and remanded Dion's case for
additional consideration. 50 Dion placed the Eighth Circuit in conflict with
a Ninth Circuit opinion that the EPA abrogated Indian treaty rights to
hunt protected eagles.51
43. Id.
44. 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
45. Umted States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 1985).
46. The Fish and Wildlife Service undercover operation began in response to information that
"an excessive number" of protected birds "were being picked up" around the Yankton Sioux
Reservation. Id. at 678. During the sting operation, which lasted more than two years, undercover
agents paid "thousands of dollars in cash for protected bird artifacts, feathers, parts and whole birds."
Id. at 678-79. The Yankton Sioux Reservation is "one of the most impoverished areas in the nation. The
1980 census reports that the 1979 per capita income on the Yankton Sioux Reservation was less than
$2,500, and more than half of all families on the Reservation were below the poverty level." Id. at 679.
The Eighth Circuit found that two of the defendants originally tried with Dion were entrapped. Id. at
690, 692.
47. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668(d) (1988).
48. United Statesv. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261, 1263 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd inpart, 476 U.S.
734 (1986).
49. Id. at 1262.
50. Id. at 1270. The Eighth Circuit noted that convictions could be supported on retrial if a
properly-instructed jury found the takings were for commercial purposes. Id. at 1270. The court cited
historical and cultural authority that the Yankton Sioux "deplored" the selling of eagle parts and
would not have considered it a part of tribal treaty rights. So the treaty rights, viewed from the
perspective of the tribe, would not have included commercial sale of eagle parts. Thus, Dion had no
treaty right to take an eagle for a commercial purpose. Id. at 1264.
51. United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980).
The court in Fryberg reasoned that reasonable, non-discnminatory conservation statutes of general
application abrogate Indian treaty rights when the statute must beapplied to limit treaty rights in order
to realize its conservation purpose. Id. at 1015.
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In hearing Dion, the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether the
EPA or the ESA abrogated Indian treaty rights to hunt protected eagles.5"
However, the Court resolved the controversy in Dton by addressing only
the EPA issue.53 While the Court in Dion didn't reach the question of
whether the ESA abrogated Indian treaty rights to hunt and fish protected
species, the Court's EPA analysis should foreshadow the Court's analysis
when it eventually addresses this ESA question.
Using the actual consideration and choice test, the Court found
"unmistakable and explicit" indications of congressional intent for the
EPA to abrogate Indian treaty rights to hunt protected eagles.54 The Court
pointed to an exception on the face of the EPA which allows Indians to
obtain a permit to take a protected eagle for religious purposes.55 This
exception is "difficult to explain except as a reflection of an understanding
that the statute otherwise bans the taking of eagles by Indians."56
Additionally, the legislative history of the 1962 amendments to the EPA
included Department of the Interior testimony that Indian religious
ceremonies contributed to the threatened extinction of eagles. This
testimony, which was attached to both the House and Senate reports,
proposed the religious exception and permit system that Congress
adopted. 57 Given evidence of congressional intent to abrogate Indian treaty
rights on the face of the EPA and in its legislative history, the Court held
the EPA completely abrogated Indian treaty rights to hunt protected
eagles.5"
Because the EPA was held to have abrogated Dion's treaty right to kill
52. Dion, 476 U.S. at 737, n.3. All parties agreed the Yankton Sioux reserved treaty rights to
hunt and fish on their lands. Id. at 737-38.
53. Id. at 745.
54. Id. at 745.
55. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a). The Eighth Circuit described the application procedure for the permits
as "labyrinthine," noting it is "unnecessarily intrusive and hostile to religious privacy." To apply for a
permit, an Applicant must complete extensive paperwork to certify that he or she is Indian and will use
the eagle parts for religious purposes. The Applicant must detail the religious ceremonies in which the
eagle parts will be used and name the religious leaders involved. The federal depository for eagle parts
for Indian religious use takes 18 months to two years to fill Indian requests for eagle parts and has never
granted approval to kill a golden eagle, although the statute provides that option. In contrast, the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service had issued permits allowing non-Indian ranchers to kill depredating eagles.
Golden eagles are not endangered or threatened. United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301, 1303-04
(D.N.M. 1986).
56. Dion, 476 U.S. at 740.
57 Id. at 741-44.
58. Id. at 745. Given the Court's holding that the EPA completely abrogates tribal hunting
rights with respect to protected eagles, one text raises the question of whether the defendant has a claim
for compensation for the taking of a recognized property right. 3 R. CLINTON, N. NEWTON, & M.
PRICE, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 227 (1991). Because such a takings claim
would arise from a treaty, tribes would file the claim through the Court of Claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1505
(1988).
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eagles, he had no such right to assert as a defense to the ESA charge against
him.59 As such, the Court determined it did not need to reach the question
of whether the ESA abrogated Indian treaty rights to hunt and fish
protected species.60 In dicta, the Court commented that the decision did
not address Dion's contentions that the ESA and its legislative history "are
to a great extent silent regarding Indian hunting rights" and that
congressional intent to abrogate Indian hunting and fishing rights is
"considerably more slim" for the ESA than for the EPA.61 Nor did the
Court address the Solicitor General's argument that hunting and fishing to
extinction exceeds the scope of treaty rights to hunt and fish.62
IV DOES THE ESA ABROGATE INDIAN TREATY RIGHTS TO HUNT
AND FISH 9
To hold that a statute abrogates Indian treaty rights, the Court must
find that Congress demonstrated plain and clear intent to abrogate those
treaty rights.6 3 In Dion, the Court adopted the actual consideration and
choice test as the standard for assessing congressional intent to abrogate
treaty rights.64 To determine whether the ESA abrogated Indian treaty
rights to hunt and fish applying the actual consideration and choice test, a
court must ask the following question: In passing the ESA, did Congress
give actual consideration to the conflict between conserving species and
Indian treaty rights, and choose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the
treaty rights9 The answer must be "yes" for a court to conclude the ESA
abrogates Indian treaty rights to hunt and fish protected species.
Only one federal district court has addressed this question since Dion.
United States v Billie arose when a Seminole Indian killed an endangered
Florida panther on the Seminole Indian reservation.65 The Billie court
found that the ESA abrogated Indian treaty rights to hunt and fish
protected species, citing evidence of congressional intent to abrogate on the
face of the ESA and in its legislative history 66
On the face of the ESA, the Billie court saw the general comprehen-
siveness of the Act and the Alaska subsistence exception as evidence of
59. Dion, 476 U.S. at 745.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 738, n.5. The Court also notes that Dion did not pursue a religious freedom claim at this
level of the proceedings. Id. at 736, n.3. As such, this note does not include the analysis necessary to
pursue a religious freedom claim, although such claims will often be connected. See, e.g., Abeyta, 632
F. Supp. 1301.
63. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986).
64. Id. at 739-40. See text accompanying notes 23-29 supra.
65. Untied States v. Billie, 667 F Supp. 1485 (S.D.Fla. 1987).
66. Id. at 1490.
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congressional intent to abrogate Indian treaties. The court concluded that
when the ESA refers to "all persons," and fails to exclude Indians, the ESA
includes Indians."7 Additionally, the Billie court analogized the ESA's
subsistence provision for Alaska natives and similarly situated non-
natives68 to the EPA exception for Indian religious use.69 Like the EPA
exception, the subsistence provision indicates that "Congress considered
Indian interests, balanced them against conservation needs, and defined
the extent to which Indians would be permitted to take protected
wildlife."
70
This analogy fails. The EPA exception specifically addresses Indians
who are primarily protected by treaty 71 In contrast, the ESA subsistence
provision only addresses Alaska natives who are primarily protected by
statute, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA),'7
rather than by treaty 731 In passing ANCSA, Congress specifically rejected
the traditional federal model for Indian relations and adopted a framework
involving native corporations organized under state law "4 Congress was
clearly aware of ANCSA, having passed the law only two years before
passing the ESA.5 Additionally, the Conference Committee considered
the definition of Alaska natives in the ESA subsistence provision to be that
definition contained in the ANCSA.76 An exception for Alaska natives
governed by a statutory scheme discussed in the ESA debates gives no
indication that Congress considered treaty rights and chose to abrogate
them. Absent congressional consideration of treaty rights in the subsis-
tence exception, the general comprehensiveness of the ESA fails to
demonstrate actual consideration of treaty rights. Therefore, the face of
the ESA fails to demonstrate the specific congressional intent necessary to
abrogate treaty rights.
While congressional intent to abrogate Indian treaties is lacking on
67. Id.
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e) (1988). See text accompanying notes 38-42 supra.
69. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1988). See text accompanying notes 54-56 supra.
70. Billie, 667 F Supp. at 1490.
71. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) and Dion, 476 U.S. at 740.
72. 43 U.S.C. 88 1601-1628 (1988).
73. As of 1985, the United States had not entered into any treaties with Alaskan Natives.
Respondent's Brief at * 19 (LEXIS) United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. at 734 (1986) (No. 85-246) cting
COHEN, supra note 2, at 739-58.
74. Arthur Lazarus, Jr. & W Richard West, Jr., The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: A
Flawed Victory, 40 LAW & CONTEMP PROBS. 132, 133-34 (1976).
75. Congress was obviously considering the subsistence needs of rural Alaskans in this time
period. The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§
3101-3233 (1988) and other scattered sections of 16 and 43 U.S.C.) also included a subsistence
provision for rural Alaskans (16 U.S.C. § 3101(c)).
76. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 740, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted tn 1973 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin News 2989, 3006.
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the face of the ESA, sufficiently compelling legislative history and
surrounding circumstances can demonstrate the congressional intent
necessary to abrogate treaty rights.77 In Dion, the Eighth Circuit, sitting en
banc, could not "find an express reference to Indian treaty hunting rights
showing congressional intent to abrogate or modify such rights in the
statutory language or legislative history" of the ESA.78 In contrast, the
Billie court concluded that Congress considered Indian treaty rights in
passing the ESA. 9
To support this conclusion, the Billie court relied on the legislative
history of two unenacted predecessors of the ESA and an unexplained
change between those bills and the final Act.80 Both bills initially provided
exceptions for Indian taking of protected species; however, Congress
deleted the exception on one bill.81 At a hearing on one bill, H.R. 13081, a
Department of the Interior official testified that Committee members
wanted to abrogate Indian treaty rights to hunt and fish protected species.
The official advised the Committee that to abrogate treaty rights Congress
must do so expressly Congress did not act on this advice.82 In the context of
this legislative history, the Billie court saw the subsistence exception as a
limited version of the Indian exceptions in the unenacted bills. The court
reasoned that Congress' choice of a more limited exception implicitly
rejected the earlier, broader exceptions and evidenced congressional intent
to abrogate Indian treaty rights to hunt and fish protected species.83
The Billie court's reliance on the unexplained disappearance of an
Indian exception in the ESA is misplaced. In Mead Corp. v Tilley,84 the
Court did not "attach decisive significance to the unexplained disappear-
ance of one word from an unenacted bill because 'mute intermediate
legislative maneuvers' are not reliable indicators of congressional in-
tent."8 5 Similarly, the silent legislative maneuvers which resulted in the
absence of an Indian exception in the ESA should not be dispositive of
whether the ESA abrogates Indian treaty rights to hunt and fish protected
species.
Even if the legislative history of the ESA's unenacted predecessors
provides insight to the ESA, that legislative history does not necessarily
77. Dion, 476 U.S. at 739.
78. United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261, 1269 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) rev'd in part, 476 U.S.
734 (1986).
79. Billie, 667 F Supp. at 1490-91.
80. Id. citing H.R. 13081, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. and S. 3199, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1491.
83. Id.
84. 490 U.S. 714 (1989).
85. Id. at 723 citing Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 61 (1947).
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lead to the conclusion that Congress considered Indian treaty rights and
chose to abrogate them. In the legislative history of H.R. 13081, officials
warned a congressional committee that to abrogate treaty rights, Congress
must do so expressly 86 If this legislative history applies, it is difficult to
explain ESA's silence on Indian treaty rights except as an indication that
Congress did not intend to abrogate those treaty rights. Moreover,
Congress later considered amending the ESA to address Indian treaty
rights and chose not to do So. 87 Congress' failure to act on this amendment
leads to the conclusion that Congress did not intend the ESA to abrogate
Indian treaty rights.
With no clear indication of congressional intent to abrogate treaty
rights on the face of the ESA or in its legislative history, the ESA fails to
satisfy the actual consideration and choice test. As such, the ESA cannot
abrogate Indian treaty rights to hunt and fish.
V ARE TREATY RIGHTS TO HUNT AND FISH LIMITED IN SCOPE9
Even if the ESA did not abrogate Indian treaty rights to hunt and fish,
the ESA may still affect those treaty rights. If treaty rights are limited in
scope, then the ESA, as a statute of general application applies beyond the
scope of the treaty right. Statutes of general application apply in Indian
Country"8 unless treaty rights are implicated.89 In Dion, the Solicitor
General argued that hunting "to extinction" exceeds the scope of Indian
treaty rights.90 The Court expressly noted it was not addressing this
argument.9
The argument that Indian treaty rights may be limited in scope for
conservation purposes stems from a line of cases regarding state regulatory
jurisdiction over tribal activities. The controversies involved the salmon
and steelhead trout fisheries in Washington State where Indian tribes
reserved treaty rights to fish "in common" with other citizens. 92 The
Puyallup decisions held that in extraordinary circumstances states can
regulate "in common" treaty fishing rights for conservation purposes so
86. Billie, 667 F Supp. at 1491.
87. Respondent's Brief at *20 (LEXIS), United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (No. 85-
246) citing Hearings on Endangered Species Act Reauthorization Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries
and Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 99th Cong., 1 st
Sess. 311 (1985).
88. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 91 (1960).
89. See, e.g., EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1989).
90. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738, n.5 (1986).
91. Id.
92. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game of Washington, 391 U.S. 392(1968) (Puyallup 1); Dep't of
Game of Washington v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973) (Puyallup II); Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of
Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (Puyallup III); Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
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long as state regulations do not discriminate against Indians fishing under
reserved treaty rights.93 The cases are not on point because they involve
state regulatory jurisdiction rather than federal pre-emption of treaty
rights. However, because of the factual similarities of government conser-
vation regulations conflicting with Indian treaty rights to hunt and fish, the
Court may consider the state regulation cases.
Addressing the "in common", off-reservation treaty rights in Puyal-
lup II, Justice Douglas stated in dicta that treaty "rights can be controlled
by the need to conserve a species. .[T]he Treaty does not give the Indians
a federal right to pursue the last living steelhead until it enters their nets."94
In Puyallup III, the Court held that "in common" treaty rights to take
anadromous fish on reservation lands no longer held by the tribe can be
limited by state regulations enforcing valid conservation purposes.95 In
Dion, the Eighth Circuit characterized the Puyallup decisions as inter-
preting "the scope of 'in common' treaty rights" rather than creating "an
alternative method of abrogating treaty rights." 96
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to apply the holding that
treaty rights are subject to state regulation beyond the "in common" treaty
rights and the factual situation in Puyallap III." In New Mexico v
Mescalero Apache Tribe, the Court refused to apply state fish and game
laws to nonmembers hunting and fishing on the reservation.98 The Court
distinguished Puyallap III because it rested on qualified, "in common"
treaty rights exercised on reservation lands no longer belonging to the tribe
and a circumstance in which the state has an interest in conserving a
"scarce, common resource." 99 In Mescalero the Court applied a balancing
test, stating:
93. Id.
94. Puyallup 11, 414 U.S. at 49. One independent study showed the Indian take accounted for a
constant 6.5% of the total catch for the years in controversy. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE
COMMITTEE, UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY: FISHING RIGHTS OF THE MUCKLESHOOT, PUYALLUP, AND
NISQUALLY INDIANS 127 (1970). While Justice Douglas spoke from a conservation perspective, the
group conducting the study adopted the following perspective, "Salmon, important in their own right,
are important here because people are important. In this uncommon controversy the fish are tied to the
questions of how a minority, a minority view, a minority style of life and thinking are to be treated." Id.
at xxv-xxvi.
95. Puyallup 111, 433 U.S. 165. During Puyallup l and l parties assumed they were addressing
off-reservation fishing rights. After these cases, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
determined the Puyallup Reservation had not been extinguished. United States v. Washington, 496
U.S. 620 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1032 (1974). The reservation encompassed most of the land
where the disputed fishing had occurred. Thus, the focus in Puyallup III shifted to on-reservation
fishing rights.
96. United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261, 1269 (1985).
97. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 342 (1983).
98. Id. at 329-30.
99. Id. at 332 n.15.
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State jurisdiction is preempted by operation of federal law if it
interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests
reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are
sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority 100
Citing Congress' overriding goal of encouraging tribal self-government
and economic sufficiency, the Court held that tribal interests outweighed
state interests in this case. 101
While Mescalero signals the Court's reluctance to extend the Puyal-
lup rationale to implicate unqualified treaty rights, the case also demon-
strates the Court's willingness to balance state and tribal interests when
determining if state jurisdiction is preempted on reservation lands. 102 The
Court developed this balancing test from previous statements weighing
state, federal, and tribal interests.10 3 However, the Court's discussions
about weighing state, federal, and tribal interests have been restricted to
the issue of state regulatory jurisdiction.10' None of the Court's statements
provide a precedent for using a balancing test to determine if a federal
statute abrogates Indian treaty rights.
10 5
Currently, the Court requires clear congressional intent for federal
statutes to abrogate treaty rights.'0 6 This requirement is firmly grounded
in the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution10 7 which gives
Congress sweeping power to regulate Indian affairs.'0 Extending the
Puyallap rationale from state regulatory jurisdiction to federal statutes
would provide an alternative, judicial method of treaty abrogation at the
federal level. Such an extension would leave two, irreconcilable lines of
cases on the standard for federal statutes to abrogate treaties. The
resulting uncertainty would lead to additional litigation seeking to limit the
scope of other Indian treaty rights and balance such rights against other
federal interests. 0 9 Extending the rationale of the Puyallup decisions to
apply to federal statutes and previously unqualified treaty rights would
100. Id. at 334 citing White Mountain Apache v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
101. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 344.
102. William C. Canby, Jr., The Status ofIndian Tribes in America Today, 62 WASH. L. REV
1, 11-13 (1987).
103. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 334 citing Bracker, 448 U.S. 136.
104. Id.
105. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 141-145.
106. Dion, 476 U.S. at 738 and text accompanying notes 21-26, supra.
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
108. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142.
109. The Supreme Court has recently decided a plethora of Indian law cases. One source
counted 63 United States Supreme Court cases between a casebook's first edition in 1973 and the third
edition in 1991. 3 R. CLINTON, N. NEWTON, & M. PRICE, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW- CASES AND
MATERIALS P V (1991).
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undermine the firm federal policy of promoting tribal self-government. 110
It is the proper role of Congress, not the Court, to regulate Indian affairs.
To maintain a cohesive body of law, the Court should not limit the
scope of unqualified treaty rights or create a judicial balancing test for
federal preemption. Rather, the Court should hold that the ESA does not
abrogate Indian treaty rights to hunt and fish protected species.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Honoring Indian treaty rights to hunt and fish need not compromise
the public interest in conserving endangered and threatened species.
Alternatives exist which allow for protecting threatened and endangered
species through tribal systems. Tribes currently protect endangered
species and their habitat.11 1 Moreover, precedent exists for environmental
statutes and regulations to delegate responsibilities to tribes." 2 With the
federal government's assistance and funding, the Mescalero Apache Tribe
established a comprehensive plan for fish and wildlife management.113 In a
similar vein, the federal government can work with tribes to develop similar
plans to protect threatened and endangered species at a tribal level.
The framework currently exists for this plan to be implemented. If a
statute is silent on a particular issue, the administrative agency charged
with implementing the statute may promulgate rules "to fill any gap left,
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. ' ' " 4 The agency is given wide
discretion; the promulgated rules must only be a "permissible construction
of the statute."" 6 Tribes can work unilaterally or in conjunction with the
110. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143-44.
111. See, e.g., Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (CS&KT), Ordinance 44D, which,
among other things, prohibits hunting of bald eagles, wolves, and grizzly bears unless the tribal cultural
committee so allows. Montana has allowed grizzly bear hunting, although the state is currently under a
temporary restraining order prohibiting the hunt. [Fund for Animals v. Turner, No. 91-2201 (MB),
1991 WL 206323 * I (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 1991)]. Thus, the tribe arguably offers stronger protection for
listed species than the state in which the reservation is located. The CS&KT also protects wildlife
habitat. See, e.g., Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1982)
(regarding protection of riparian areas for water quality and fisheries) and Joint Board of Control v.
U.S., 832 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1007 (1988) (regarding protection of tribal
fisheries.) The CS&KT recently received authorization to perform ESA section 7 (the jeopardy
provision) review on reservation lands. (Personal communication with John Carter, Attorney for
CS&KT, March 25, 1992.) The Yakima Indian Nation zoned a heavily forested area of their
reservation as a closed area. The tribe restricted public access to that area, protecting water quality and
wildlife habitat. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989).
112. Richard A. Du Bey, Mervyn T. Tano, & Grant D. Parker, Protection of the Reservation
Environment: Hazardous Waste Management on Indian Lands, 18 ENVTL. L. 449,466-469 (1988).
113. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 325 (1983).
114. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) citing
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974).
115. Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 843.
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United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the administrative agency
charged with implementing the ESA, to develop tribal plans to protect
threatened and endangered species.
Alternatively, Congress could amend the ESA to abrogate Indian
treaty rights to hunt and fish protected species but provide for tribal
participation in implementing the ESA on reservation lands. However,
amending the ESA is less desirable than encouraging tribal protection of
endangered species for three reasons. First, because the ESA will be
subjected to numerous other amendments, it may not be politically wise to
place another hurdle in the path of the ESA's reauthorization. Secondly,
amending the ESA to include tribal participation entails abrogating treaty
rights and thus infringes upon tribal sovereignty And finally, as discussed
above, abrogating Indian treaty rights to hunt and fish protected species
would subject the United States to takings claims.
VII. CONCLUSION
The issue of whether the ESA abrogates Indian treaty rights to hunt
and fish protected species remains unresolved. The Court requires a
showing of clear congressional intent for legislation to abrogate treaty
rights. The requisite intent is absent in the ESA. Some have argued that
treaty rights to hunt and fish are limited in scope and do not encompass the
right to hunt and fish protected species. This argument creates an alternate
judicial means of federal treaty abrogation and is a departure from current
constitutional and common law Application of legal precedent leads to the
conclusion that the ESA does not abrogate Indian treaty rights to hunt and
fish protected species.
Honoring treaty rights to hunt and fish need not compromise federal
efforts to conserve endangered and threatened species. This issue is best
resolved by developing federally-assisted, tribal-based plans for conserving
threatened and endangered species on reservation lands.
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